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We consider optimal copyright protection strategies from the government and pro-
ducer perspectives. Our model assumes that the government sets the penalty for in-
fringement, and that the producer is responsible for monitoring illegal activity. We
ﬁnd that depending on the production cost of the goods, the government should set
copyright penalties either to zero or to a level that makes the producer’s proﬁt zero.
We also show that the social surplus is greater under a civil law scheme than a criminal
law scheme when the production cost of the goods is high. On the other hand, it is
better to apply penalties under criminal law when the production cost is low.
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With the emergence of new computer technologies, illegal copies of copyrighted goods are
becoming increasingly easy to create and obtain. According to the Japanese Association of
Copyrights for Computer Software (ACCS, 2004), about 16.1 million music ﬁles worldwide
are exchanged annually by peer-to-peer software such as Napster and Gnutella, and 92% of
these ﬁles are exchanged without the copyright holder’s permission. The illegal use of copy-
righted goods has also increased in other media markets. England’s International Federation
of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI, 2006) reports that the global traﬃc in pirated products
amounted to US$4.5 billion in 2005. More than one-third of all music discs purchased glob-
ally are illegal copies. The U.S.A. Business Software Alliance (BSA, 2006) estimates that
in 2005, the illegal software market caused about US$34 billion in damages. Similarly, the
Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA, 2006) reports that damages in 2005 due to
movie piracy reached US$6.1 billion. Illegal copies decrease the producer’s proﬁt. Copyrights
act to protect this proﬁt, which in turn maintains the incentive for producing creative works.
Copyrights essentially grant the right holders exclusive use of their goods, and can be used
to legally force others not to use copyrighted goods without permission.
A person whose copyright is violated can pursue legal relief, but the burden is placed on
copyright holders to actively enforce their rights. If a right holder discovers illegal copies of
his work on the market, he can enforce two penalties. First, the right holder can demand
ﬁnancial compensation for damages under civil law. In the U.S.A. there are two types of
compensation: actual damages (to proﬁts), and statutory damages. Actual damages are
quantiﬁable losses suﬀered by the copyright holder as a result of the infringement. Statutory
damages are proportional to the number of works copied. In the U.S.A., statutory damages
range from $750 to $150,000 per work (U.S.C. §504(c)). A second option is for the right
holder to punish oﬀending parties under criminal law. The maximum criminal penalty for
copyright infringement in the U.S.A. is $500,000 in ﬁnes, ﬁve years in prison, or both (U.S.C.
1§506).
As mentioned above, the government and the right holders have diﬀerent roles in protect-
ing a copyright. It is the producer’s responsibility both to monitor illegal use and assume the
cost of monitoring. The government’s role is to decide the size of the civil and/or criminal
penalty imposed when an infringement is brought to its attention. The purpose of this paper
is partly to determine which of the two copyright protection schemes is optimal under this
division of roles.
The number of criminal cases involving illegal copies has steadily increased along with the
number of copyright infringements. One high-proﬁle example is Japan’s ﬁling of criminal
charges against the programmer of the “Winny” peer-to-peer ﬁle sharing software. The
European Commission has proposed a law that could allow criminal charges to be pressed
against businesses using software believed to infringe upon another company’s intellectual
property. However, it is not clear how these criminal penalties will aﬀect the public welfare.
This paper considers the optimal level of the penalty, and whether criminal law or civil law
should be used to protect copyrights.
There are two sides of the issue to be considered. With respect to the optimal penalty,
note that any copyright protection policy has two contradictory objectives. One the one
hand, it has to reward producers and provide a reasonable incentive to create new works.
On the other hand, copyright protection that is too eﬀective will grant producers monop-
olistic power and damage the social surplus. This tension amounts to a trade-oﬀ problem
which must be solved when designing an optimal copyright protection scheme. The second
matter to consider is which penalty scheme is more desirable from the social point of view.
If the penalties are enforced under civil law, then illegal users will have to pay damages to
compensate the producer. Under criminal law, the government collects the penalty. Increas-
ing either penalty tends to prevent illegal use and reduce the surplus of illegal copies. A
high penalty thus decreases the producer’s monitoring cost. On the other hand, producers
2will tend to set a higher price when the penalty for infringement is high. It is thus not clear
what the optimal penalty level should be.
The producer’s strategy, which consists of its pricing and monitoring policies, depends
on the penalty scheme. As mentioned above, a copyright holder can prevent copyright
infringements under either kind of penalty. The main diﬀerence between the two legal
schemes is who obtains the compensation; producers recover damages under civil law but
not under criminal law.
We obtain the following results. First, we ﬁnd that government should set the penalty
to either zero or to a level such that the producer’s proﬁt from infringement becomes zero.
Next, we compare the two copyright protection schemes. We show that in terms of the social
surplus, civil law is preferable to criminal law when the cost of development is high. When
the cost of development is low, however, it is better to apply criminal law.
The literature on copyright protection can be divided into two groups, which will be re-
viewed and related to the present work in turn. The ﬁrst group considers optimal government
policies, and includes the works of Novos and Waldman (1984), Johnson (1985), Conner and
Rumlet (1991), and Yoon (2002). Novos and Waldman (1984) and Yoon (2002) consider
the social impact of increasing the marginal cost of illegal copies through government pol-
icy. Yoon (2002) also discusses the eﬀect of copyright protection on society, concluding that
there are only three optimal solutions: (i) no protection, (ii) a level of penalty such that
the producer’s proﬁt is zero, and (iii) full protection. Johnson (1985) studies the eﬀect of
imposing a tax on copying and granting a subsidy for original purchases, and shows that
illegal copies are harmful to the social surplus. Conner and Rumlet (1991), on the other
hand, show that not protecting copyrights at all could be the best policy in an environment
with positive network externality.
The present paper diﬀers from the above works on several points. First, we take into
account the fact that the government and the producer play diﬀerent roles in protecting the
3copyright. Second, previous research implements government policy as an increase in the
marginal cost of making illegal copies. This paper assumes only that the government sets
and imposes a penalty on illegal users.
A second group of researchers considers the actions taken by right holders to prevent
illegal use and other forms of non-governmental protection. Yooki and Scotchmer (2004),
for example, analyze joint initiatives taken by the business community to develop new tech-
nology preventing illegal copies. Arai (2005) discusses copyright protection measures taken
by associations of original producers. These authors do not consider actions taken by the
government in their work, however. This paper is concerned with both the right holder and
the government.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the basic model. Section 3 considers
the optimal producer strategy under a civil penalty. Section 4 considers the optimal producer
strategy under criminal law. Section 5 then discusses which protection scheme is better from
a social point of view. Section 6 concludes. All proofs are given in the Appendix.
2 The Model
We consider a monopolistic market for copyrighted goods such as compact discs, videos,
computer software, etc. The consumer valuations vi of the goods are uniformly distributed
on the interval [0,1]. Each consumer wants to buy at most one unit. If consumer i buys
the original good at its retail price p, his utility is given by vi − p. Consumers also have the
option of making illegal copies at no cost. As illegal copies are generally of lower quality
than the original goods, the consumer’s valuation of the copy is given by αvi. The constant
α (0 <α<1) represents depreciation of the item’s quality. To prevent illegal use, the
producer can monitor consumer activity. The producer’s monitoring cost function is given
by c(s)=ks2(k>0), where s is the probability of detecting a given illegal user. We assume
4that k is high enough that the cost is signiﬁcant. When an illegal use is detected, the
consumer is punished by a penalty g set by the government. We present a multi-stage game
model to consider the optimal copyright protection scheme in this monopolistic market. The
three stages of the game have the following rules:
1. The government chooses a penalty level g ≥ 0.
2. The producer decides whether or not to produce the goods at a ﬁxed cost F>0.
If the producer decides to produce the goods, he chooses a price p and a monitoring
probability s.
3. Consumers decide whether they will buy the original product, make an illegal copy, or
do nothing.
We consider both civil law penalties and criminal law penalties. Under civil law, the
producer obtains the penalty paid by illegal users as a part of their proﬁt. Under criminal
law, the government collects the penalty. The government’s goal is to maximize a social
surplus function (the consumer and producer surplus) by setting the penalty for illegal use
at the correct level. We analyze the subgame perfect equilibrium by backward induction.
First let us consider the consumers’ behavior.
Lemma 1
Given a penalty g,p r i c ep and monitoring probability s, the optimal choice of consumers
is not to obtain the good if and only if












5and will buy the original good if and only if




A consumer’s behavior thus depends on his valuation of the good, the price, the quality
of an illegal copy, and the expected penalty. In the ﬁrst case, consumers will ignore a good
when their valuation of the original is lower than the price p and their valuation of the illegal
copy is lower than the expected penalty sg. In the second case, the utility of making illegal
copies is positive and higher than the utility of purchasing original goods. In the third case,
consumers prefer original goods to illegal copies because the utility of purchase is positive
and higher. Producers choose the price p and monitoring rate s at the second stage. We
consider their strategy in the next section.
3 Civil law penalty
We deﬁne the producer’s strategy as S = {(p,s)|p ≥ 0,1 ≥ s ≥ 0},w h e r ep is the price
and s is the monitoring probability. For convenience of analysis, we divide the strategy space
S into two sub-classes: S1  { (p,s)|s<α p / g } and S2  { (p,s)|s ≥ αp/g}.
For every strategy (p,s) ∈ S1, it holds that sg/α < p < (p − sg)/(1 − α). When
the producer employs a strategy in sub-class S1, Lemma 1 predicts the consumer behavior
illustrated in Figure 1.
Not consume Illegal copy Buy 
sg
ǩ




Figure 1: Consumer behavior under strategies in sub-class S1
Consumers with valuations larger than (p−sg)/(1−α) buy the original goods, those with
6valuations between sg/α and (p−sg)/(1−α) make illegal copies, and those with valuations
less than sg/α do not consume. The demand for goods Do and the demand for illegal copies











From Equation (1), we also obtain the producer’s proﬁt π as











The ﬁrst term in this equation represents sales, and the second term represents penalties
collected from illegal users. The next lemma shows the optimal output in sub-class S1 under
civil law.
Lemma 2
Assume that the producer’s strategy is restricted to sub-class S1. When goods are to be


























1 is negative, no goods will be produced.
For every strategy (p,s) ∈ S2, it holds that (p − sg)/(1 − α) ≤ p ≤ sg/α.W h e n
the producer employs a strategy in sub-class S2, Lemma 1 predicts the consumer behavior
illustrated in Figure 2.




Figure 2: Consumer behavior under strategies in sub-class S2
Consumers whose valuation is greater than p will buy the original goods, while those
with valuations less than p do not consume the goods at all. The demand for goods Do and
the demand for illegal copies Dc a r et h u sg i v e nb y
Do =1− p, Dc =0 . (3)
From (3), we obtain the producer’s proﬁt
π2 = p(1 − p) − ks
2 − F.
The original producer will maximize his proﬁt subject to s ≥ αp/g. The next lemma shows
the optimal output in S2 under civil law.
Lemma 3
Assume that the producer’s strategy is restricted to sub-class S2. When goods are to be




















2 is negative, no goods will be produced.
8The iso-proﬁt curves of the strategy space are depicted in Figure 3. The straight lines are
loci of strategies that maximize proﬁt with respect to price and monitoring rate in the sub-
class S1. It follows that the producer’s proﬁt in sub-class S1 is maximized at their intersection
A. In sub-class S2, the maximum proﬁt is obtained at the intersection of s = αp/g and














Figure 3: Iso-proﬁt curves under civil law
Proposition 1
















where illegal copies may exist.
This proposition shows that the producer will choose a strategy in S1. Choosing a strategy
in S1 greatly increases the circulation of the work, so the proﬁt from illegal users can easily
9outweigh the cost of monitoring. Essentially, the producer accepts that fewer consumers will
pay for the good in exchange for the proﬁt to be obtained from all the consumers infringing
the copyright.
We now consider the optimal penalty level against illegal users under civil law. The
government chooses the penalty to maximize the social surplus, which is deﬁned as the sum
of the producer surplus and the consumer surplus. If the producer chooses not to create
































8(g2 + kα)2 − F
The ﬁrst term represents the proﬁt of the producer. The second and third terms represent
the consumer surplus due to illegal copies and legal purchases respectively. The next lemma
considers how changes in the civil law penalty aﬀect the social surplus.
Lemma 4




(2) If (1 − α)/4 ≤ F<1/4, then
SW(g)=0for 0 ≤ g ≤






< 0 for g>

kα(4F + α − 1)
1 − 4F
.
(3) If 1/4 ≤ F, then SW(g)=0for all g.
10The interpretation of this lemma is clear. The social surplus is a decreasing function
of the penalty, because the number of participating consumers decreases as the penalty
increases. The producer’s proﬁt is an increasing function of the penalty, because he can
aﬀord to decrease the monitoring cost as the penalty increases. When the penalty is low
and the production cost is high, the producer may decide not to create the goods at all. In
such cases the social surplus will be zero. The next proposition deﬁnes the optimal civil law
penalty in the same three cost regimes.
Proposition 2
The optimal civil law penalty g∗ is given by
g





















As discussed in Lemma 4, the government desires to maximize the social surplus by
setting the civil law penalty as low as possible. The original producer may decide not to
create goods if the penalty is too low, however, because his proﬁt is an increasing function
of g. In the ﬁrst case (0 ≤ F<(1 − α)/4) the cost is low enough that the government
can set the penalty to zero. In the second case, setting the penalty to zero will result in a
negative proﬁt for the producer. The government thus gives the producer an incentive to
create goods by imposing a penalty. The level of the penalty is set just high enough to result
in a non-negative proﬁt. In the third regime, the producer will never create goods because
the production cost is too high.
114 Criminal law penalty
In this section, we consider the case of a criminal penalty. The right holder does not proﬁt
from a criminal penalty, but the government does. We again consider the previously deﬁned
sub-classes of strategies S1 and S2. The consumer behavior and the producer proﬁt in S2
are of course the same under criminal law since there is no illegal activity. We thus consider
only strategies in sub-class S1.












From Lemma 1, we can obtain the producer’s proﬁt as





The ﬁrst term represents sales, and the second term is the monitoring cost. We see that
by applying criminal law, the producer’s proﬁt has changed for strategies in S1. The next
lemma gives the optimal strategy for a given criminal penalty.
Lemma 5 When the producer’s strategy is restricted to sub-class S1, his proﬁt is max-
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for g ≤
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2kα(1 − α).
When the proﬁt π∗














Figure 4: Iso-proﬁt curves under criminal law
The optimal strategy within S1 is an interior solution when g ≤

2kα(1 − α). Figure
4 illustrates the relationships of Lemma 5. The dashed curve ∂π1/∂p = 0 has a ﬂatter
slope under a criminal penalty than the solid curve under a civil penalty. The dashed curve
∂π1/∂s = 0 also slopes become ﬂatter under a criminal penalty. The maximum proﬁt under
a criminal penalty thus moves to point B, the intersection of ∂π1/∂p =0a n d∂π1/∂s =0 .
If the penalty g is larger than

2kα(1 − α), however, the producer simply sets the price
13as p = sg/α. I nt h i sc a s et h es l o p eo f∂π1/∂p = 0 is ﬂatter than that of p = sg/α.T h e
intersection of ∂π1/∂p =0a n dp = sg/α is B . Then the optimal solution in S1 becomes a
corner solution, and producer’s proﬁt is maximized at point C, the intersection of ∂π1/∂p =0
and p = sg/α. We show this in our next proposition.
Proposition 3
When the entire strategy space S is considered, the proﬁt of the producer under criminal









8k(1 − α) − 2g2
for g ≤
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Again, this proposition can be interpreted in a straightforward manner. When g<

2kα(1 − α), the producer chooses a strategy in S1 because it is too costly to monitor
illegal use. If g exceeds this limit, the producer chooses a strategy that shuts out all illegal
users from the market since they cannot obtain the penalty under criminal law.
When no goods are produced, of course, the social surplus is zero. Otherwise the social



















(2αg4 − g4 +1 2 αk2 − 6αg2k − 20α2k2 +4 α3k2 +4 α4k2 +4 α2g2k +2 α3g2k)
2α(4αk − 4k + g2)
2 − F
14The ﬁrst term is the optimal proﬁt of the producer, and the second term is the surplus of
consumers buying the goods. The third term sums the surplus of consumers making illegal
copies and the penalty collected by the government. As the penalty is a transfer from illegal
users to the government, it cancels out when calculating the social surplus.















3g4 +4 α4k2 +6 α2g2k
8(g2 + α2k)
2 − F
In this case, the producer’s choice of price and monitoring probability shuts out all illegal
users. The social surplus is thus the sum of the proﬁt of original goods and the surplus
of consumers who buy the goods. The ﬁrst term is the optimal proﬁt of producer, and
the second term is the surplus of consumers buying the goods. The next lemma shows the
impact of a criminal penalty on the social surplus.
Lemma 6
A penalty paid to the government aﬀects the social surplus as follows:




(2) If (1 − α)/4 ≤ F<(1 − α)/2(2 − α), then
SW(g)=0for 0 ≤ g ≤






< 0 for g>

k(1 − α)(4F + α − 1)
F
.
15(3) If (1 − α)/2(2 − α) ≤ F<1/4, then












(4) If 1/4 ≤ F, then SW(g)=0for all g.
This result can be interpreted in the same manner as Lemma 4. The following proposition
discusses the optimal criminal penalty.
Proposition 4
The optimal criminal law penalty g is given by
g

































This result can be interpreted in the same manner as Proposition 2. The government
wants to set the criminal law penalty as low as possible to maximize the social surplus.
However, the government has to set a high enough penalty to prevent the producer’s proﬁt
from being negative. In the cost is low (0 ≤ F<(1−α)/4) then the government can aﬀord
to set the penalty to zero. In the second and the third case, goods will not be created if
the government sets the penalty to zero. Instead the government sets a penalty just high
enough to prevent the producer’s proﬁt from being negative. In the last case, the producer
16does not create goods at any penalty level because the production cost is too high.
5 Discussion
In this section we compare the civil law and criminal law penalty schemes. It is not
immediately clear from the above analysis which protection scheme is better from the point
of view of society, but we are now ready to ﬁnd the optimal copyright protection scheme.
The next proposition compares the producer’s optimal proﬁts under each protection scheme.
Proposition 5
The producer’s proﬁt is larger under a civil penalty than under a criminal penalty.
This clearly supports our intuition, as the producer can proﬁt from the penalties imposed
on illegal users under civil law. According to Propositions 2 and 4, the government will set the
civil penalty either to zero or to a level that makes the producer’s proﬁt zero. Therefore, the
criminal law penalty has to be larger than the civil law penalty in order to cover production
costs. In the U.S.A. Copyright Act, the allowed statutory damages range from $750 to
$150,000 per work. Under criminal law, on the other hand, the ﬁrst copyright infringement
is punishable by up to $500,000. This example supports our proposition. Next, we consider
the optimal copyright protection scheme.
Proposition 6
From the point of view of society, a criminal law scheme is better when the production
cost is in the range 0 ≤ F<5(1 − α)/4(5 − 2α). Otherwise, a civil law scheme is better.
This proposition can be interpreted as follows. When the production cost is low, the
penalty set by the government is also low. The producer thus has little incentive to monitor
17illegal activity under criminal law because he does not proﬁt from the penalty. It follows
that under criminal law, more consumers will be using the goods. The criminal law scheme
is therefore better than the civil law scheme when the production cost is low.
When production cost is high, on the other hand, the producer has an incentive to absorb
the cost of monitoring and remove all illegal copies from the market. Under criminal law,
the producer monitors illegal use excessively and reduces the number of consumers using the
goods. The government can thus increase the social surplus by adopting a civil law penalty.
This will give the producer an important incentive to proﬁt from illegal use by assuming
a more moderate monitoring strategy. Goods with a high production cost should therefore
be protected under civil law. Movies and video games are examples of goods with a high
production cost that should be protected by civil law, and music discs are an example of
low-cost goods that should be protected by criminal law.
We end this section by pointing out some of the key assumptions in this work. First,
criminal law penalties and civil law penalties are distinguished simply by changing the agent
who obtains the penalty. However, there are many other diﬀerences between these penalty
schemes. For instance, under criminal law illegal users may be punished by imprisonment.
The threat of such punishment may also have a negative eﬀect on illegal activity in the long
run, but such non-monetary eﬀects are not treated in our model. Another diﬀerence is that
under civil law, the right holder can proﬁt by claiming compensation for his actual damages.
The calculation of actual damages would be based on the number of sales, not on the number
of works copied. We do not include such actual damages in this model. Finally, note that in
the real world illegal activity may be punished by both criminal penalties and civil penalties.
This model does not consider a dual punishment scenario.
We could also use the model presented here to calculate the equilibrium output in other
situations. For example, we have assumed that consumer valuations vi are uniformly dis-
tributed on the interval [0,1]. If this assumption is violated, the resulting consumer behavior
18could change drastically. The result of such a model depends on several additional assump-
tions, and will be the topic of future research.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we determine the optimal copyright protection scheme under a model where
(a) the government sets a penalty to maximize the social surplus, (b) producers must monitor
illegal activity, and (c) only civil penalties are paid to the producer. We obtain the following
results.
First, we show that the optimal penalty level is always either zero or that which sets the
producer’s proﬁt to zero. A zero penalty may be imposed when the cost of production is
low enough that proﬁts can be made even in the presence of illegal activity. When the cost
of production is higher, the government must set a positive penalty to keep the producer’s
proﬁt from falling below zero. To maximize the social surplus, however, the government
wants to set the penalty as low as possible. It follows that the penalty imposed will be that
which sets the producer’s proﬁt to zero.
Second, we compare the two copyright protection schemes. In real situations, copyright
infringement is often punished under both civil law and criminal law. It is important to
show which scheme does a better job of protecting the copyright. We show that when the
development cost is high, civil law schemes are better from the point of view of society (i.e.,
the producer’s optimal strategy under civil law leads to more consumers using the goods).
When the development cost is low, on the other hand, it is better to apply criminal law.
Our analysis suggests that changes should be made in the direction of modern copyright
policy. Recently, the punishments for copyright infringement have become severe. The
government should perhaps reduce these penalties to a point where the private gain of
producers is much smaller, but not negative. Copyright infringements are typically punished
19by civil penalties. We point out that goods with a low development cost are better protected
by criminal law. The government can increase the overall social surplus by adapting the
penalty scheme to the development cost of the product.
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207 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
In this lemma, we consider the optimal consumer behavior. In the ﬁrst case, when
consumers use the original product they obtain a higher utility than when making an illegal
copy or not using it at all. We therefore obtain the equations
vi − p ≥ αvi − sg, vi − p ≥ 0.
In the second case, when consumers make illegal copies they obtain a higher utility than
when buying the original product or not using it at all. We therefore obtain the equations
αvi − sg > vi − p, αvi − sg ≥ 0.
Finally, there is the case of consumers who choose not to consume the product because the
utilities of buying and copying are both negative. We obtain the equations
0 >v i − p, 0 >α v i − sg.
The lemma follows from these equations. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2
21The optimal price p∗ and the optimal monitoring probability s∗ are the solution to
max
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We can consider the case p∗ > 0,s ∗ > 0,λ 1 =0a n dλ2 = 0, because we assume that k is

























22The producer decides to produce the goods, if his proﬁt is not negative. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3
The optimal price p∗ and the optimal monitoring probability s∗ are the solution to
max
p,s π2 = p(1 − p) − ks
2 − F
























The producer decides to produce the goods, if his proﬁt is not negative. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1
















4(g2 + kα2)(kα+ g2)
> 0
We can show that the producer’s proﬁt is larger in strategy space S1. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 4














The social surplus is a decreasing function of the penalty g when goods are produced. Goods
will not be produced, however, if the proﬁt is negative. The producer’s proﬁt depends on
t h em a g n i t u d e so fg and F, and is an increasing function of g.
In the case of 0 ≤ F<(1−α)/4, the production cost is smaller than the minimum proﬁt
π∗(0) = (1 − α)/4. In this case the producer will create goods for all g. In the second case,
the production cost is larger than the minimum proﬁt of the producer. If the penalty is so
low that the producer’s proﬁt is negative, the producer will not create any goods. In the last
case, the production cost is larger than the maximum proﬁt of the producer. In this case,
no goods will be produced for any value of g. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2
From Lemma 4, the social surplus is a decreasing function of the penalty if goods are
being produced. In the ﬁrst case the government should choose g = 0 because the producer
will create goods even if there is no penalty. In the second case the penalty should be chosen
at the minimum level that provides an incentive for the producer to work. In the last case,
the producer can not produce the goods for any g. The government’s optimal penalty is
therefore unconstrained. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 5
24The optimal price p∗ and the optimal monitoring probability s∗ are the solution to
max
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p ≥ 0
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8k(1 − α) − 2g2.
The optimal price and monitoring probability satisfy the condition s<α p / gwhen g<

2kα(1 − α). The optimal proﬁt of the producer when g<






4k(1 − α) − g2 − F.
25We can also consider the case p∗ > 0,s ∗ > 0,λ 1 > 0a n dλ2 =0w h e ng ≥

2kα(1 − α).











which is equivalent to the optimal strategy of S2. The optimal proﬁt of the producer when
g ≥









Proof of Proposition 3
We compare the maximum proﬁt in S1 to that in S2 under a criminal penalty in order











(g2 − 2kα+2 kα2)
2
4(g2 + kα2)(4k − 4kα− g2)
.
This equation is positive when g ≤

2kα(1 − α), and negative otherwise. The producer
thus chooses the optimal strategy in S1 when g ≤

2kα(1 − α), otherwise he chooses the
optimal strategy in S2. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 6
The social surplus when goods are produced is given by
SW1(g)=
(2ag4 − g4 +1 2 ak2 − 6ag2k − 20a2k2 +4 a3k2 +4 a4k2 +4 a2g2k +2 a3g2k)




2kα(1 − α), and
26SW2(g)=
3g4 +4 a4k2 +6 a2g2k
8(g2 + a2k)








2 (4 − a)g3k








Equation (8) is negative for g ≤

2kα(1 − α). The social surplus is thus a decreasing
function of g when goods are produced. The producer will not create any goods if his proﬁt
is negative. The proﬁt depends on the magnitudes of g and F, and is an increasing function
of g.
In the case of 0 ≤ F<(1 − α)/4, the monitoring cost is smaller than the minimum
producer’s proﬁt π∗( 0 )=( 1− α)/4. The producer will create goods for any value of g
in this case. In the second and third cases, the production cost is larger than the mini-




2kα(1 − α) )=( 1− α)/2(2 − α), which is the maximum proﬁt in S1. No goods will
be produced if the penalty is so low that the producer’s proﬁt is negative. The producer
chooses the strategy in S2 for (1 − α)/2(2 − α) ≤ F. In the last case, the production cost is
larger than the maximum proﬁt and no goods will be produced for any value of g. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4
From Lemma 6, the social surplus is a decreasing function of the penalty g when goods
are produced. In the ﬁrst case, the government chooses the minimum penalty g = 0 because
the producer will create goods for any value of g. In the second and third cases, the penalty
is chosen at the minimum level that provides incentive for the producer to work. In the
last case, the producer cannot aﬀord to create goods for any value of g. The government’s
optimal penalty is therefore unconstrained. Q.E.D.
27Proof of Proposition 5
We compare the producer’s proﬁt under each penalty scheme. First, we compare the
optimal proﬁt in S1 under civil law (πv














4k(1 − α) − g2 =
(g2 − 3kα+3 kα2)g2
4(kα+ g2)(4kα− 4k + g2)
(9)
This equation is positive when g ≤

2kα(1 − α).
Next, we compare the optimal proﬁt in S1 under civil law (πv
1) to the optimal proﬁt in

















4(g2 + kα2)(kα+ g2)
> 0 (10)
From Equations (9) and (10), it can be shown that the proﬁt under civil law is always larger
than that under criminal law. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6
We compare the social surplus under each penalty scheme. We obtain the social surplus
under the optimal civil law protection scheme by substituting g∗ into Equation (5):


















We then obtain the social surplus under the optimal criminal law protection scheme by
28substituting g∗ into Equations (6) and (7):

































We compare Equations (11) and (12) for (1 − α)/4 ≤ F<(1 − α)/2(2 − α):
(3a − 8F +1 6 F 2 +1 )
8a
−
(8F +3 a − 10Fa− 16F 2 − 2a2 +2 Fa 2 +4 F 2a − 1)
2a(1 − a)
= −
(4F + α − 1)(8Fα− 5α − 20F +5 )
8(1− α)α
This equation is negative when F is less than 5(1 − α)/4(5 − 2α).
We compare Equations (11) and (13) for (1 − α)/2(2 − α) ≤ F<1/4:














We thus prove that the criminal law scheme is better than the civil law scheme for 0 ≤ F<
5(1 − α)/4(5 − 2α). On the other hand, the civil law scheme is better than the criminal law
scheme for 5(1 − α)/4(5 − 2α) ≤ F. Q.E.D.
29